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1. Introduction 
     Long have nation states been the sole legitimate users of violence. The German sociologist 
Max Weber understood this monopolisation of violence to be one of the core characteristics 
of what defined a state
1
. Domestically, nation states would legitimately police their citizens 
and provide them with protection from outside forces. Externally, international law would 
help condition the acts of violence by states. Legitimate violence was neatly organised and 
clearly understood by the majority, if not all of those involved in international affairs. 
Recently, this monopolisation of violence has been compromised. A challenge to this 
Weberian conceptualisation of violence has emerged, embodied by private companies 
offering services of a military nature, intruding into the once exclusive domain of nation 
states. Strongly gaining momentum after the end of the Cold War, private military companies 
(PMCs) have increasingly grown in importance as their services are employed in higher 
numbers by nation states, international organisations, NGOs, and other actors that seek to 
meet their security needs. However, the proliferation of these companies has proved to be 
problematic for the international order, as the commercial and military character of these 
companies has caused uncertainty and doubt regarding the morality of their activities, as well 
as concerns about the legality surrounding PMCs, their accountability, and the loss of 
democratic control over the use of violence. The issue of PMCs became particularly salient as 
a result of the increased use of PMCs by the United States and the United Kingdom during the 
Afghanistan and Iraq War.  
     Due to these concerns, some nation states and international organisations have sought to 
ban PMC activity, while others have recognised the necessity to control and regulate the 
private military industry. In this regard, South Africa has often served as an exemplary case of 
a state implementing a tight regulatory scheme for PMCs. Even though the choice for this 
form of regulation can be understood as a reaction to the links between South African PMCs 
and the apartheid regime
2
, some scholars have found that the regulatory framework that South 
Africa implemented was not without its faults, and that several lessons could be learned from 
the South African case
3
. It is therefore important to analyse how different states have 
attempted to regulate the private military industry, to further improve future plans to regulate 
the industry. The contribution of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the 
                                                 
1
 Chesterman and Lehnardt (2009: 1) 
2
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3
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domestic laws and regulations that the United Kingdom and the United States have 
implemented in order to control and regulate PMCs, and explaining the factors that led both 
states to reach different legislative and regulatory outcomes. The research question I seek to 
answer is: What factors account for the different legislative and regulatory responses of the 
United Kingdom and the United States to the issues related to private military companies? 
     This thesis attempts to analyse the problem from a historical institutionalist approach, and 
is therefore mostly focused on explaining how pre-existing norms and patterns of behaviour 
present in both states conditioned the options that both British and U.S. policymakers 
seriously considered when attempting to regulate the private military industry. The scope of 
this analysis is therefore limited, and does not represent the full explanation of why the United 
Kingdom and the United States responded differently on how to regulate PMCs. In addition, 
the thesis focuses just on three institutions, leaving much room for future studies to further 
enrich our understanding of the topic. I will start by reviewing the academic literature that 
attempts to explain what the factors are that influence the choices that policymakers make 
when regulating the private military industry and other quasi-military private actors. I will 
then continue by explaining the use of historical institutionalism to answer my research 
question, followed by the methodology used to come to my main findings, which consists 
mostly of a historiographical approach in combination with text and document based 
techniques. Lastly, I will present my analysis showing how three institutions have conditioned 
the legislative and regulatory outcomes of the United Kingdom and the United States. I will 
conclude that the role perception of PMCs in policymakers, the military culture, and the 
orientations of policymakers, have conditioned the paths to PMC regulation chosen by the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  
2. Literature Review 
     The academic literature explaining or identifying the factors that account for states 
implementing or changing domestic law and regulation of PMCs is very limited. The focus of 
most scholars studying PMCs is usually on accountability issues and oversight
4
, problems of 
democratic deficit
5
, the gap in international law
6
, and morality. However, this has not 
impeded some scholars in analysing some of the explanations of why states change domestic 
                                                 
4
 Yastin (2011: 495); Kwok (2006: 35); Jordan (2009: 336); Mehra (2010: 332) 
5
 Percy (2009: 18) 
6
 Doswald-Beck (2009: 115) 
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law and regulation of PMCs. South Africa is often seen as a great example of a state 
attempting to prohibit mercenaries and regulate PMCs
7
. Some scholars have identified a 
number of factors that could explain why South Africa decided to implement a strong 
regulatory framework for PMCs. Firstly, Liu argues that this strong response by South Africa 
reflects the country’s unique history of mercenarism and the ‘political backlash’ of alleged 
connections to the apartheid regime
8
. Secondly, the Foreign Military Assistance Act 1998 (the 
legal document that introduced the strong regulatory framework to South Africa) could be 
seen as a clear response to the ‘high-profile contracts’ of Executive Outcomes9, the company 
that introduced the PMC phenomenon to the world. Thirdly, South Africa further developed 
its regulatory framework by replacing the 1998 Act with the Prohibition of Mercenary 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 2006, which the South African Minister of 
Defence though necessary as a measure to tackle some of the failures of the 1998 Act. The 
South African government was to a large extent motivated by “the recent arrest of a number 
of South African citizens, allegedly involved in a planned coup d’état aimed at overthrowing 
the Government of Equatorial Guinea”10. It is worth noting that certain events seem to have 
an important effect on a government taking action towards regulating PMCs. In the case of 
South Africa, both the activities and publicity of Executive Outcomes, and the arrest of South 
African citizens that were thought to be involved in a planned coup d’état of a foreign state 
became important factors in explaining why South Africa decided to implement and adjust 
domestic law and regulation concerning PMCs. 
     Isenberg notes that ‘the form of, and motivation for, regulating differs according to 
region’11. For example, he argues that the problem with South African legislation is that the 
South African government ‘views PMC activity with suspicion’, due to the fact that many of 
the employees of South African PMCs were formed during the apartheid regime, and are 
often seen by the South African government as potential troublemakers
12
. In contrast, 
Isenberg argues that the United States views PMCs as part of their ‘total force’, essentially 
making PMCs a fundamental part of U.S. military strategy
13
. This sharp contrast between 
both states strongly conditions the manner in which they approach domestic law and 
regulation concerning PMCs. The United States is more concerned with the coordination of 
                                                 
7
 Liu (2010: 150) 
8
 Liu (2010: 150) 
9
 Avant (2006: 161) 
10
 Republic of South Africa (2005: 9) 
11
 Isenberg (2009: 84) 
12
 Isenberg (2009: 85) 
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 Isenberg (2009: 85) 
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PMC efforts and U.S. soldier operations, ensuring that PMCs are properly punished if they 
commit a crime, and standardising contracting practices
14
. These scholars point to some of the 
aspects that can affect both the legislation and the policy process, leading each country to 
different outcomes in domestic law and regulation. 
     In addition to the limited academic literature that concerns itself specifically with PMCs, 
other scholars focus on factors that explain why states implement or change domestic law and 
regulation of quasi-military actors, more specifically private security companies in Europe
15
. 
The inclusion of this literature shows that privatising not only happens abroad for military 
services, but also at home for security services
16
, and that states are attempting to regulate 
both. Two cases that are often studied are the United Kingdom and Germany. Krahmann 
analyses how these two European countries approach the private military industry and in 
which ways they choose to exercise control over companies within this industry. One of the 
important points that she makes is that “the relationships between private military companies 
and their Western home governments frequently contribute to shaping the corporate structures 
of these firms and thus influence their behaviour at home as well as abroad”17. Krahmann 
refers to two types of relationships: Public-Private partnerships and regulation. Firstly, 
Krahmann shows how both the United Kingdom and Germany have implemented different 
forms of public-private partnerships, which have resulted in both states arriving at different 
opinions on whether and how to control and regulate private security and military services
18
. 
She argues that the United Kingdom has preferred to adopt a market-oriented approach, 
whereas Germany has opted for state control in private firms providing military and security 
services in the form of corporate shareholding and joint ventures
19
. Krahmann describes how 
the British government started to privatise the defence industry during the Thatcher 
administration and much later during the Blair administration, an era that saw privatisation in 
many areas of government in a country where market-oriented approaches were popular, and 
cost efficiency was a strong argument. It could be argued that perhaps the predominance of 
the neo-liberalist thought in the United Kingdom had a strong impact on the speed of 
privatisation of the defence industry, as well as the strong focus on self-regulation. Germany, 
on the other hand, lacked this particular predominance, and was far more cautious in 
privatising its defence industry, placing more importance on strategic concerns of the state, 
                                                 
14
 Isenberg (2009: 85) 
15
 Krahmann (2005: 277) 
16
 Krahmann (2005: 277) 
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19
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rather than cost efficiency of the industry, which showed in the country’s preference for tight 
corporate as well as legislative control 
20
. In addition, Krahmann explains that even though 
the United Kingdom and Germany both had such different original positions on whether and 
how to control and regulate private security companies, the policies of both states seem to be 
converging due to two developments
21
.  Firstly, although the British government placed their 
hopes on a self-regulatory approach, unacceptable failures such as the Sandline Affair, in 
which “the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was accused of having knowledge of the 
illegal exports of arms to Sierra Leone by the London-based private military company 
Sandline International
22”23, led the British government to reconsider its original position, and 
seriously consider regulation as a potential tool to control the industry. The second 
development was the increasing political pressure from within the European Union to 
standardise the regulation of private security companies within the supranational body
24
. Both 
the pressure from the European Union and the Sandline affair conditioned and influenced how 
the United Kingdom would act towards the private military and security industry.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
     In this thesis I will attempt to explain why the United Kingdom and the United States have 
arrived to different legislative and regulatory outcomes concerning the private military 
industry and PMCs, by using the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, which is 
only one of many traditions of ‘new institutionalism’ that emerged as a direct reaction to the 
dominance of behaviourism and rational choice theory in the study of political science
25
. At 
the core of these new approaches to the study of political science was the renewed interest in 
the importance of institutions in explaining political outcomes
26
. However, the understanding 
of what institutions are differs substantially from its original use by old institutionalists
27
. 
Institutions are no longer limited to meaning political organisations such as parliaments, 
government ministries, or international bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Under new institutionalism, an institution is understood as a ‘stable, recurring pattern of 
                                                 
20
 Krahmann (2005: 285) 
21
 Krahmann (2005: 292) 
22
 Sandline International was disbanned in 2004. However, its founder, Tim Spicer founded a new PMC called 
“Aegis Defence Services” 
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 Lowndes (2009: 61) 
26
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behavior’28, laying more focus on the informal conventions of politics without neglecting 
formal structures
29
. Furthermore, new institutionalists focus on analysing how institutions 
‘embody values and power relations’, and pay attention to ‘the obstacles as well as the 
opportunities that confront institutional design’30. In essence, new institutionalists attempt to 
analyse the relationship between institutions and behaviour, as well as attempt to explain the 
process of how institutions are formed, changed, and kept at the status quo
31
. 
     New institutionalism has six core assumptions that differentiate it from traditional 
institutionalism
32
. Firstly, new institutionalism has changed its focus from organisations to a 
focus on rules. As was mentioned earlier, ‘political institutions are no longer equated with 
political organizations; rather, they are seen as a set of ‘rules’ that guide and constrain the 
behaviour of individual actors’. Secondly, new institutionalism shifts its focus from a ‘formal 
to an informal conception of institutions’33. New institutionalists focus on informal rules as 
well as formal rules. Thirdly,  institutions are no longer seen as ‘things’ as was often the case 
in traditional institutionalist analyses, but rather as dynamic ‘processes’. In this view, 
institutional stability is achieved by a constant process of consensus, in the context of a 
changing environment
34. Fourthly, new institutionalists take a ‘value-critical’ stance. 
Lowndes sums this up well when he argues that ‘new institutionalists seek to identify the 
various ways in which institutions embody – and shape – societal values’. Offe argues that 
institutional change occurs when institutions are found to be incompatible with emerging or 
new values
35
. Fifthly, instead of focusing on whole systems of government, as traditional 
institutional scholars did, new institutionalists focus on ‘component institutions of political 
life’36. And lastly, new institutionalists analyse institutions within an embedded environment 
of institutions. In other words, ‘political institutions are not independent entities, existing out 
of time and space’37, but instead exist embedded in various contexts.  
     Historical institutionalism is, as well as the other traditions of new institutionalism, based 
on the six core assumption mentioned above. However, it has additional elements that 
                                                 
28
 Goodin (1996: 22) 
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35
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37
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differentiate it from the other traditions. One of the key elements of historical institutionalism, 
as well as being what it makes it different to the other traditions of new institutionalism, is the 
notion of path dependency
38
. Path dependency is crucial for understanding institutional 
efficiency and inefficiency. Historical institutionalists tend to argue that institutional designs 
often lead to inefficient outcomes, due to the notion of path dependency. Path dependence 
refers to “a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time … 
shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that makes alternative institutional designs less 
likely to triumph”39. The context of previous decisions and institutional designs causes future 
institutions to be inefficient. In contrast, rational choice institutionalists tend to argue that 
actors will arrive at efficient outcomes that represent the power relations of the utility 
maximising actors that are involved
40
.     
     Historical institutionalism is particularly apt for analysing the factors that explain why the 
United Kingdom and the United States arrived at different legislative and regulatory 
outcomes. Other scholars have done analyses with similar dynamics to the one presented in 
this thesis. As Hall and Taylor argue “analysts in this school [historical institutionalism] 
began to explore how … social and political institutions … could structure interactions so as 
to generate distinctive national trajectories”41. ‘Analysing distinctive national trajectories’ is a 
core element in my analysis of domestic law and regulation of PMCs. Examples of research 
using a historical institutional approach are Katzenstein’s study42 explaining why the policies 
of the advanced industrial countries differed so much when responding to the oil crisis of 
1973, Thelen’s work43 on explaining why some industrial relations systems proved to be more 
stable than others under pressure of globalisation, and Steinmo’s analysis44  of the differences 
in taxation and public spending among different countries
45. Katzenstein’s analysis of policy 
responses to the oil crisis of 1973 is particularly similar in dynamic to the analysis of this 
thesis. 
     Furthermore, historical institutionalism focuses on the types of processes that are 
characteristic of international relations, focusing on explanations that look at ‘founding 
                                                 
38
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moments in shaping long-term power relations’, how new ideas become norms, how 
unintended consequences occur, and the reasons for the ‘prevalence of incremental reform 
over stasis and fundamental transformations’46. In addition, a historical institutionalist 
approach focuses on the notion that “the timing and sequence of events shape political 
processes”47. This means that later events are significantly conditioned by earlier ones, 
making radical institutional redesign a rather improbable and rare phenomenon. Historical 
institutional analysis illustrates how past decisions influence and condition the preferences of 
actors regarding current and future institutions
48
. Furthermore, institutional change only 
occurs when the benefits of the new design outweigh the losses of ending the past design. 
However, as Fioretos points out, “since the nature (and understanding) of such losses is 
contingent upon the institutional context in which individuals are embedded, exposure to the 
same external parameters typically generates diverse responses”49. This is an important 
implication that would affect a historical institutionalist analysis of how the United Kingdom 
and the United States came to different outcomes in regulating PMCs. It shows the potential 
this approach could have in explaining different outcomes based on institutionalist analysis.  
     Historical institutionalism as employed in this thesis emphasises the cultural approach, as 
opposed to the calculus approach. This approach stresses the importance of an actor’s 
worldview in determining behaviour, and acknowledges that actors do not behave in a fully 
strategic manner
50
. A direct consequence of this is the fact that actors are not seen as utility 
maximisers, as would be the case in rational choice institutionalist analyses, but instead see 
actors as satisficers. Hall and Taylor reinforce this by arguing that “the choice of course of 
action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on purely instrumental 
calculation”51. Form a historical institutionalist perspective, institutions then provide not only 
‘strategically-useful’ information, but also condition the worldviews, identities, perceptions, 
and preferences of actors
52
. 
     Historical institutionalism helps answer the research question of this thesis by providing it 
with the right framework to highlight the importance of the historical contexts that 
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conditioned the options that policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States 
considered for regulating the private military industry. The concept of an “institution” lays the 
focus on norms and patterns of appropriate behaviour and tendencies, which can make a 
strong contribution to explaining my dependent variable, while illustrating the importance of 
path dependence for explaining how past decisions and pre-existing institutions affected 
policymakers in implementing a regulatory scheme for PMCs. I will use three institutions to 
explain the diverging paths that both states took towards regulating the private military 
industry, and how they were conditioned by policy paths that were taken in the past. These 
include the institution of “role perception”, the institution of “military culture”, and the 
institution of “orientation in policymaking. These institutions laid important restrictions on 
the options that later policymakers would consider. In particular, these institutions are better 
explained using the cultural approach, rather than the calculus approach. The emphasis in 
these institutions lies in the culture that they have embedded in them, and which serve to 
condition the actions of policymakers that are pursuing adjustments in law and regulation. 
The analysis focuses on norms and patterns of behaviour that can explain why policymakers 
in the United Kingdom and the United States reached different outcomes. Indicators of these 
norms and patterns of behaviour are difficult to pinpoint, but have to be identified from 
official documents of parliament, government, experts, and work of other scholars to attempt 
to produce a good sense of what characterises these institutions and how it affects 
policymaking in the United Kingdom and the United States.   
4. Methodology 
     The analysis of this thesis is based on a qualitative historiographical approach in which 
text and document based techniques
53
 are employed to explain my dependent variable, namely 
domestic law and regulation responses of states to the problems concerning PMCs and the 
private military industry. In addition, the analysis will include the analysis of official 
documents produced by state institutions such as the parliament, foreign affairs offices, and 
government. Particular attention will be given to the historical context in which both states 
developed, as well as in what characterises both states, in regard to the three independent 
variables, and how certain norms and patterns of behaviour are embedded in them. I will also 
base my work on the analyses of other scholars that have identified differences between the 
United Kingdom and the United States relating to one of the three dependent variables that I 
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use to explain the difference between both states in regulating and controlling the private 
military industry. I will start by defining the concepts that I use in my analysis. 
Concepts 
     For my analysis, the precise definition of what a private military company is not relevant. 
The importance lies not in the nature of PMCs and what they are, but rather on the private 
military industry and the services that are provided in it. The focus of the analysis is to 
explain how both countries have decided to react to the lack of regulation of this industry, as 
well as why both states have followed different paths. However it is necessary to define the 
three concepts that help explain the variation in the dependent variable: Role perception, 
military culture, and orientation in policymaking. 
     Firstly, “role perception” refers to the manner in which policymakers of a given country 
view the role of PMCs to be in their state. In other words, policymakers possess 
preconceptions about the nature of PMCs and what their potential role could be relative to the 
interest of the polity. For example, as I covered in the literature review, South African 
policymakers were heavily influenced in their choice of regulating and controlling PMCs. 
This was due to the links that such private actors had with the apartheid regime. I build upon 
this argument, and look at how the perceived role of PMCs according to U.S. and British 
policymakers, prompted them to act differently to each other. Secondly, I will use the 
definition of “military culture” given by Cassidy: 
Military culture can … generally be defined as the embedded preferences 
within a military organization that shape that organization’s preferences on 
when and how the military instrument should be used. It is derived or 
developed as a result of historical experience, geography, and political culture. 
Core leaders inculcate it and perpetuate but it is most pronounced at the 
operational level because when armies have met with success in war, it is the 
operational techniques and the operational histories, by which enemies were 
defeated, which are consecrated in memory.
54
 
 
The importance of this concept is how the historical context in which wars are fought 
and won, as well as how states organise their military, helps to institutionalise certain 
norms and behaviours in soldiers. Different military cultures ask for different 
approaches to disciplining or rewarding soldiers. Thirdly, “orientation in 
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policymaking” refers to the tendency, or embedded common procedures that are 
present in policymakers, which condition the options that they consider for solving 
government issues.   
Case Studies 
     I have chosen the United Kingdom and the United States as my two case studies. These 
states are particularly interesting, since the vast majority of PMCs are based in these 
countries. Both states have a huge private military industry, and both were faced with similar 
problems concerning this particular industry during the first decade of the new millennium. 
The end of the Cold War, but perhaps more significantly the emergence of the War on Terror, 
and the involvement of both the United Kingdom and the United States in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, make comparing both nations regarding their approaches to domestic 
law and regulation of PMCs, particularly interesting. The analysis is mainly focused on 
explaining the reasons behind the choices that policymakers in both states have made 
regarding the lack of regulation that was present in the private military industry in the years 
after the Cold War. 
Hypotheses 
     Based on my case studies and the concepts that I will use to help explain my dependent 
variable, I first hypothesise that the role perception that policymakers in the United Kingdom 
and the United States had institutionalised, conditioned the options that were considered 
seriously. Secondly, I hypothesise that the variance in military culture in the United Kingdom 
and the United States conditioned the options that were considered by policymakers and led to 
different outcomes. And lastly, I hypothesise that differences in the orientations of 
policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States conditioned the options that were 
considered by policymakers in both states and led both states to different forms of regulating 
the private military industry. 
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5. Analysis 
     In the following sections I will analyse three factors that contributed to how the United 
Kingdom and the United States both reached different outcomes for controlling and regulating 
the private military industry of their states. Firstly, I will start by arguing that both states were 
presented with similar problems concerning the private military industry and the behaviour of 
PMCs. In the second section I portrait the current configuration of domestic law and 
regulation that are present in both states, and discuss some of the important characteristics. In 
the third section I will show how the role perception that U.S. and British policymakers had 
about the private military industry and PMCs conditioned the options that they gave serious 
consideration, as well as the outcome in domestic law and regulation. Fourthly, I will analyse 
how the military culture of both states influenced the United Kingdom and the United States 
in deciding how to regulate the private military industry. And lastly, I will look at how 
orientation in policymaking shifts that occurred in the United Kingdom impacted the British 
response to the problems associated with PMCs. 
 A. The PMC Problem 
     Making a strong case for the factors that contribute to explain why the United States and 
the United Kingdom responded differently in terms of domestic law and regulation to the 
PMC problem would have to start by making an equally strong claim that the PMC problem 
was indeed very similar, if not identical in both countries. The arguments that show how 
particular institutions explain the different behaviours of both countries, would be made much 
stronger if the factor that prompted both countries to respond in the first place, was the same. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the basis and nature of the concerns with PMCs and 
the private military industry, both in the United States and the United Kingdom. Identifying 
the PMC problem in both countries would also implicitly explain why both countries did 
respond to it, in some way or another. These points are the focus of this chapter. I will argue 
that the problem concerning the PMCs was very similar in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, based on three arguments. Firstly, both countries have shown deep concerns 
about the abuse of human rights by PMCs in foreign operations, and how this reflected on 
them. Secondly, both countries were concerned with the possibility that PMCs would act in 
ways that were not aligned with their foreign policy. And Lastly, both countries came under 
~ 15 ~ 
 
immense international pressure to control PMCs, mostly due to the first point mentioned 
above. First I look at the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom 
     The 2002 Green Paper stated that “although successive governments have deplored the 
activities of mercenaries, no effective legislation exists to prevent either their recruitment or 
their participation in conflict”55, highlighting the fact that the United Kingdom had to start 
thinking seriously about regulating the private military industry. Tracing back to the origins of 
the first instances were British policymakers start to voice serious concerns on the problem 
with PMCs, one would have to start on February 1999, when the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee recommended the British government to start working on “the publication, 
within eighteen months, of a Green Paper outlining legislative options for the control of 
private military companies which operate out of the United Kingdom, its dependencies and 
British Islands”56. The concerns of the Foreign Affairs Committee were a direct reaction to 
the Committee’s inquiry on the involvement of Sandline International, a British-based PMC, 
in delivering weapons to Sierra Leone, a region where the United Kingdom was enforcing an 
arms embargo dictated by the United Nations
57
. Although Sandline International had already 
gained some international exposure due to their involvement in Papua New Guinea in the 
Sandline Affairs, it was not until the company’s involvement in Sierra Leone that politicians 
in the United Kingdom started the discussion on PMCs. In 2002, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee pointed in its Ninth Report to some of the concerns that PMCs presented. It pays 
specific attention to the problems related to human right abuses
58
. The Ninth Report 
documents how the United Nations Special Rapporteur warns the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission for the development of PMCs, and how they offer their services in 
increasingly aggressive ways, emphasising their efficiency and military expertise
59
. However, 
he urges the Human Rights Commission to “remember that mercenaries base their 
comparative advantage and greater efficiency on the fact that they do not regard themselves as 
being bound to respect human rights or the rules of international humanitarian law. Greater 
disdain for human dignity and greater cruelty are considered efficient instruments for winning 
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the fight”60. The Ninth Report states the opinions of some of the important industry actors 
such as ArmorGroup and Tim Spicer, founder of Sandline International and Aegis Defence 
Services. According to the Ninth Report, these players believe that their own vetting 
procedures are more than capable of eliminating the possibility that their employees would 
abuse human rights in any way. Tim Spicer told the Foreign Affairs Committee that “we 
[Sandline International] do have the ability to vet our employees carefully and to ensure that 
they behave, in so far as we can … I cannot think of anybody who works for my organisation 
or is likely to work for my organisation who might transgress and disappear into the depths of 
Eastern Europe because I would not employ him in the first place if that were where his 
nature bolt hole was”61. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee was not entirely convinced 
by these statements. As the Ninth Report states: 
We are not, however, convinced that the checks and balances that apply to 
national armed forces can ever be applied with equivalent strength to 
employees of PMCs. Though companies’ vetting mechanisms may go some 
way towards ensuring that the individuals involved in private military 
operations are appropriately qualified, we also share the Green Paper’s 
conclusion that “it is not an accident that the business of fighting for money 
often brings in unattractive characters”62. 
     This statement by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons illustrates the 
view that the PMC industry needs regulating, which is reinforced by the fact that “the demand 
upon states to intervene in situations of instability and human right abuses is not declining
63
. 
     As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the discussion about regulating the PMC industry 
was prompted by two events, where the involvement of Sandline International caused 
embarrassment for the British government, as well as contradict, in certain aspects, the 
foreign affairs policy of the British government. The first event, which was popularly labelled 
as the ‘Sandline Affair’, served as an example for the British government how the actions and 
behaviour of PMCs could have an impact on their international reputation. As Michael Bilton 
argued “a nightmare scenario where a company is licensed by the British Government to 
undertake training of a foreign army, that the trainers become combatants, and that massive 
overkill leads to heavy loss of innocent life. Where would the finger of blame point: the 
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British Government would surely be in the firing line”64. This fear for possible damages to the 
international reputation of the United Kingdom was realised with the Sandline Affair. This 
political scandal began when Sandline International closed a deal with the government of 
Papua New Guinea, in which the PMC would provide the government of Papua New Guinea 
with the manpower, equipment and skills required to assist the armed forces of the country to 
fight against "the illegal and unrecognised Bouganville Revolutionary Army", as the 
opposition army was referred to in the agreement
65
. Disagreements between the PMC force 
and the armed forces of Papua New Guinea regarding the deployment of an additional 80-man 
PMC force outside of Port Moresby, which arguably was not included in the agreement 
between both parties, angered the army and almost caused a military coup
66
. Further 
developments included riots, mutinies, and the biggest political crisis in Papua New Guinea in 
22 years
67
. The operation of Sandline International in Papua New Guinea was opposed not 
only by the United Kingdom, but also by Australia and New Zealand, both regional 
Commonwealth allies of the United Kingdom
68
. This event constituted an embarrassment for 
the British government, as it led to a position where the British government had to solve this 
conflict, and where it had to repair any damages caused to its relationship with Australia and 
New Zealand.  
     The second event also involved the British-based PMC Sandline International, as the 
company provided weapons to Sierra Leone, in violation of the United Nations arms embargo, 
as well as British Law. This is probably the clearest example of a PMC acting in a way that is 
against the foreign and defence policy objectives of the United Kingdom. One of the main 
conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee was that “It is the view of the Committee that 
Mr Spicer should have known the law about arms sales to Sierra Leone”69. However, it was 
not only the PMC that was at fault during the Sierra Leone affair. The British government, as 
well as the Foreign Affairs Committee in other wording, have stated that “the report (referring 
to a previous independent report executed by Sir Thomas Legg and Sir Robin Ibbs about the 
same affair) concluded that Mr. Penfold (the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone at 
the time) gave the Sandline project a degree of approval, and that he had no authority to do 
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so”70. The Sierra Leone Affair prompted the United Kingdom to rethink how it communicated 
internally, as well as how it could prevent such events from happening. Some of the practices 
that the British government changed as a direct result of the recommendations of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee included “that the requirement for written licences should be included in 
all relevant Orders in Council under the United Nations Act 1946, not only in those dealing 
with arms embargoes”, as well as a promise to produce “within 18 months, a Green Paper on 
mercenary activity, taking account of discussions with our partners in the UN, the EU and 
other international fora. The paper will address both the international and the UK context”71. 
This would become the 2002 Green Paper, perhaps the most comprehensive official document 
about the intent of the United Kingdom to regulate and control PMCs. This appears to be the 
moment that the United Kingdom seemed to have realised that regulation for the private 
military industry was much needed. The Ninth Report states that “an important objective of 
regulation must be to ensure that any operation undertaken by a British-based and licensed 
company is in line with the United Kingdom’s overall foreign and defence policy 
objectives”72. No doubt this illustrates an important lesson that British policymakers learned 
after two scandalous events that hurt their image internationally and conflicted with their 
foreign (and defence) policy objectives.    
 
The United States 
     Perhaps the first scandal that the United States faced concerning a PMC and human right 
abuses was the DynCorp International incident in the Balkan wars, were a number of 
DynCorp employees allegedly ran a prostitution business, selling the services of girls as 
young as twelve
73
. The man that disclosed the activities of his work colleagues was Ben 
Johnston. DynCorp fired him and did nothing in particular to discipline its employees
74
. The 
United States Department of Defence went on to write a proposal to prohibit activities of sex 
trafficking of defence contractors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, but certainly illustrative of the 
culture within some of these companies, was the fact that some PMCs, including DynCorp 
International, attempted to stall the adoption of the prohibition of sex trafficking of defence 
contractors into U.S. Law
75
. Johnston, when talking about the DynCorp incident in Bosnia, 
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voiced one of the main concerns regarding human right abuses and the international 
reputation of the United States:  
The Bosnians think we're all trash. It's a shame. When I was there as a soldier 
they loved us, but DynCorp employees have changed how they think about us. 
I tried to tell them that this is not how all Americans act, but it's hard to 
convince them when you see what they're seeing. The fact is, DynCorp is the 
worst diplomat you could possibly have over there.76 
 
     A few years later it was the U.S. PMC Blackwater, which has sinced changed its name 
several times and is currently operating under the name ‘Academi’, that found itself in 
headlines all over the world. It is quite possible that Blackwater is the most popularly 
recognisable name when talking about PMCs. The company became well known when in 
March 2004 two Blackwater SUVs were ambushed in Fallujah, Iraq, and four of its 
employees were killed and hung above a bridge over the river Euphrates77. The incident 
angered many Americans and precipitated an American response, which came in the form of 
Operation Vigilant Resolve, which simply put consisted of a force of U.S. marines retaking 
the city of Fallujah. A few years later in 2007, the House Oversight Committee reported that 
Blackwater “delayed and impeded" a congressional probe into the 2004 killings of four of its 
employees in Fallujah”. In October 2010 certain facts concerning PMCs in Iraq were leaked 
by WikiLeaks as part of the ‘Iraq War Documents leak’. In this document, employees of 
Blackwater were reported to have been seen shooting indiscriminately at civilians on the 
scene after an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strike78, as well as an incident in which 
Blackwater employees shot a civilian car, killing a father and wounding his wife and daughter. 
There appears to have been an “escalation of force” by Blackwater employees on the years 
leading to the Nisour Square shooting79. Furthermore, the leaked documents reveal how an 
Iraqi ambulance was destroyed by “uncontrolled small arms firing” by Blackwater employees, 
and in 2006 the killing of an Iraqi civilian by Blackwater employees, and other incidents in 
Kirkuk and Hilla, led to civilian demonstrations80. 
 
     There are two conclusions that can be made after reviewing the activity of some of the 
U.S. PMCs. Firstly, human rights abuse is an important factor of concern for the U.S. 
government, if not for the moral argument that human rights abuse is wrong, then for the 
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argument that human right abuse by U.S. PMCs lead to international embarrassment and 
significantly deteriorates the international reputation of the United States. Secondly, it 
becomes crucial for the United States that PMCs act in ways that are in line with the strategic 
concerns of the United States. Especially looking at the incident where four Blackwater 
employees were killed and hung from the bridge in Fallujah, this incident precipitated an 
American response, something that the U.S. probably had not initially planned, and forced the 
country’s hand to adjust its military activities. As argued by Isenberg, it is important for the 
United States to regulate its PMCs in order to make sure that these companies act in 
accordance with its strategy81. This is the case because “The United States … increasingly 
views PMCs as part of the total force”82. This means two things. Firstly, that the United States 
wants to assure that PMCs act in accordance with U.S. military strategy. And secondly, that 
the United States needs to assure that PMCs act in ways that do not abuse human rights. As 
Isenberg notes:  
Its [of the United States] concerns tend to be administrative: how to ensure 
co-ordination between theatre commanders and PMCs, how to prosecute 
PMC personnel if they commit a crime, how to ensure common standards for 
issuing and implementing contracts83. 
 
 
The International Context 
 
     An important factor that influenced both the United Kingdom and the United States and 
that I am discussing here in relation to both states, is the negative perception that the 
international community had of PMCs and the private military industry, often seen as nothing 
more than mercenaries. This international context was embodied by many actors within the 
United Nations, and in particular by the supranational body’s firm stance against the use of 
PMCs. This stance is to a large extent based on moral objections to private force84. Percy 
argues that “abolitionism … has been strongly institutionalized within the UN and is still 
actively advocated by some players within it”85, and notes that: 
The creation of international laws dealing with mercenaries early in their 
appearance on the world stage left many with a sense that mercenaries and 
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PMCs are banned by international law, even though in reality no such explicit 
ban exists86. 
It appears that the fact that feelings of anti-mercenarism were often included in official 
documents of the UN, international law, and even the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, gave many individuals the impression that mercenaries were 
“illegal actors needing control”87. This institutionalisation of anti-mercenarism in the UN 
provided, in a very present way, an international context in which PMCs and those involved in 
PMC affairs, either by hosting them or hiring them, would have to operate. Both the United 
Kingdom and the United States were affected by this, as the UN would increasingly attempt 
to go out of their way to discredit PMCs and PMC operations, and those that would hire such 
companies. For example, in 2005 the UN established a Working Group on the “Use of 
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right 
of Peoples to Self-determination”, a group that would investigate PMC missions and attempt 
to find any signs of unethical and illegal acts
88
. However, in 2010 the United Nations changed 
its position and stated that it would start to use PMCs for U.N. peacekeeping missions
89
. It has 
been quite a shift for the UN from being the strongest critics of PMCs, to practically 
becoming their clients. This will undoubtedly have implications for the future of PMCs in the 
international community. It seems that PMCs are here to stay.  
B. Domestic Law and Regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom 
     In the previous section I discussed how both the United Kingdom and the United States 
encountered similar problems concerning the activities of PMCs. Both countries had issues 
with human right abuses by PMCs, and had concerns about PMCs acting in conflict with the 
country’s foreign and defence policy objectives. In this section I will show how the United 
Kingdom and the United States chose to regulate and control the activities in behaviour of 
PMCs. This will show that, although both countries were affected by similar issues, they also 
reacted to these issues differently. I will start by looking at the domestic law and regulation in 
the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom 
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     In 2008 there was a motion in the House of Commons which stated the following:  
This House is concerned by the exponential growth of private military and 
security companies (PMSCs) since the invasion of Iraq; is disturbed by the 
substantial rise of reported incidents of civilian killings and human rights 
abuses by PMSC guards in Iraq who remain unregulated and unaccountable; 
further notes that problems posed by proliferation of PMSCs were highlighted 
in a Green Paper in February 2002 that originated in a request from the Foreign 
Affairs Committee but that, six years later, there is still no United Kingdom 
legislation regulating PMSCs; believes that self-regulation by the industry is 
not appropriate in this instance; and urges the Government to bring forward 
legislative proposals for the control of the PMSC sector as an urgent priority.
90
 
     The 2002 Green Paper that the House was referring to, brought forth several policy 
recommendations concerning PMCs. In this paper the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) 
analysed the British government’s engagement with PMCs, which led them to request the 
contracts between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence, 
and the Department for International Development on the one hand, and PMCs and private 
security companies on the other
91
. However, they were not able to receive the contracts. As 
the FAC states in their report: 
The FCO was unable to supply us with this information [the contracts] … The 
reason given for the FCO’s inability to supply information about these 
contracts was that they are “managed locally and details are not held 
centrally
92
.  
     The FAC concluded in its report that “the lack of centrally held information on contracts 
between Governments Departments and private military companies is unacceptable”. The 
FAC further recommended that “the Government take immediate steps to collect such 
information and to update it regularly”. Yet the most intriguing part of the report is when the 
FAC states the need for a licensing regime in the United Kingdom. The FAC states that under 
this licensing regime companies would be required to “obtain a license for each contract for 
military and security services abroad”. The FAC recommended such a license regime in 
addition to recommending the Government to “consider carefully how to ensure that a 
licensing regime allows companies to operate with necessary speed without compromising the 
effectiveness of the vetting process”. According to the FAC, this licensing regime would be 
effective because it would reward those companies that demonstrate “high professional 
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standards, levels of transparency, appropriate staff recruitment and training”93. The FAC 
further recommended that “as part of the application procedure for registration, private 
military companies be required to disclose to the Government in some detail the company 
structures, the experience of permanent personnel, recruitment policies, and other relevant 
information”94. 
     The FAC realises not only the need for regulation of PMCs, but also the lack of this 
regulation. This was ten years ago. In 2008, the House of Commons further attempted to 
reopen the issue by introducing the motion to revisit the points discussed in the 2002 Green 
Paper. As the motion stated, nothing had changed since the recommendations of the 2002 
Green Paper, up to January 2008. This is, however, not entirely true. In 2003, the Security 
Industry Authority (SIA) was founded to regulate the private security industry. This could be 
seen as the reaction that was talked about and discussed in the 2002 Green Paper. It also 
typifies the British preference for “light licensing regimes”, rather than imposing direct 
contracting requirements. As was voiced in the 2002 Green Paper, the House of Commons 
opted for measures that reward PMCs that have the appropriate conduct and performance 
relative to the preferences of the British government. In addition, this system would also 
sanction PMCs that do not comply with the requirements. PMCs would be required to register 
to a British “light regulatory framework” in order to be eligible to provide private security 
services. This register would “facilitate the development of a responsible private military 
sector by rewarding companies which could demonstrate high professional standards, levels 
of transparency, appropriate staff recruitment and training. It would provide significant 
incentive for companies to be transparent and to maintain high professional standards, 
because failure to meet the standards demanded to join this general register would constitute a 
clear indictment of a company’s credentials”95. The SIA, however, did not manage to have the 
impact that was expected of the licensing regime. It is also worth mentioning that the United 
Kingdom is mostly focused with this sort of regulation, instead of implementing policy 
changes in contract practices, as the United States did in 2008. Ironically, the FAC implied in 
the Green Paper, as the motion presented in the House of Commons in 2008 stated, that the 
United Kingdom was doing poorly in regulating PMCs, as well as acknowledging “the long 
experience of the United States government in working with private military companies”. 
This view prompted the FAC to recommend the government to “examine carefully the United 
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States government’s regime for regulating and monitoring the activities of private military 
companies” when considering options to regulate PMCs. 
The United States 
     The FY2008
96
 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calls for significant 
implementations and adjustments to the contents of future contracts for “contractors 
performing private security functions” 97 in the United States. In the NDAA it is stated that: 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation issued in accordance with section 25 of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act … shall be revised to require insertion into 
each covered contract … of a contract clause addressing the selection, training, 
equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions 
under such contracts.
98
 
     The NDAA includes clause requirements, the implications of noncompliance of personnel 
with clause, and the requirement to submit a report on a pilot program on imposition of fines 
for noncompliance of personnel with clause. Firstly, the clause minimum requirements stated 
in the NDAA include that the contractor shall “register, process, account for, and keep 
appropriate records of personnel performing private security functions in an area of combat 
operations
99”, as well as “authorize and account for weapons to be carried, or available to be 
used by, personnel performing private security functions in an area of combat operations”. In 
addition, they are also responsible for the “registration and identification of armored vehicles, 
helicopters, and other military vehicles operated by contractors and subcontractors performing 
private security functions in an area of combat operations”, and the reporting of incidents in 
which “a weapon is discharged by personnel performing private security functions in an area 
of combat operations, personnel performing private security functions in an area of combat 
operations are killed or injured, or persons are killed or injured, or property is destroyed, as a 
result of conduct by contractor personnel”100. These requirements account for the number of 
personnel that PMCs use in an area of combat operations, and the weapons and armored 
vehicles that they have to their disposal, as well as require the reporting of incidents of injury 
and casualty of PMC personnel.  
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     Secondly, the NDAA further requires that contractors ensure that their personnel are 
briefed and understand their obligation to comply with “qualification, training, screening, and 
security requirements established by the Secretary of Defense for personnel”, “applicable 
laws and regulations of the United States and the host country, and applicable treaties and 
international agreements, regarding the performance of the functions of the contractor”, and 
“orders, directives, and instructions issued by the applicable commander”101. In addition, the 
contractor is required to cooperate with “any investigation conducted by the Department of 
Defense … by providing access to employees of the contractor and relevant information in the 
possession of the contractor regarding the incident concerned”.  
     Thirdly, the NDAA states the implications of noncompliance of personnel with clause. 
They are as follows: 
The contracting officer for a covered contract may direct the contractor, at its 
own expense, to remove or replace any personnel performing private security 
functions in an area of combat operations who violate or fail to comply with 
applicable requirements of the clause required by this subsection. If the 
violation or failure to comply is a gross violation or failure or is repeated, the 
contract may be terminated for default.
102
 
     The U.S. government retains the power to remove PMC personnel when they fail to 
comply with the agreements of the contract, and, if necessary, cancel the contract with the 
PMC. And lastly, the NDAA calls for the reporting by the inspector general of the 
Department of Defense on the pilot program on sanctioning for noncompliance of personnel. 
According to the NDAA the report should include “an assessment of the feasibility and 
advisability of carrying out the pilot program”. If deemed so, the report shall also include 
“recommendations on the range of contracts and subcontracts to which the pilot program 
should apply”, as well as a “schedule of fines to be imposed under the pilot program for 
various types of personnel actions or failures”103. The adjustments to U.S. domestic law on 
PMC contracting that are stated in the FY2008 NDAA clearly represents the U.S. government 
effectively communicating to any PMC that they hire, what is expected of them, and what the 
consequences are of noncompliance. The fact that the U.S. needed to implement these policy 
adjustments as late as 2008, might imply to a certain extent that they were lacking them in 
previous years. The NDAA specifically mentioned the Iraq, as well as the Afghanistan War 
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and how old practices were not sufficiently capable of assuring the accountability of 
contracting
104
.  
     The enactment of Public law 110-181 introduced several changes in policy that improve 
the US government’s ability to obtain information about the PMC. The FY2008 NDAA called 
for the establishment of a “commission on wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan”105. 
The commission was given seven core duties, but two of them are particularly interesting. The 
commission would assess “the performance exhibited by Federal contractors for the contracts 
under review … and the mechanisms used to evaluate contractor performance”106, as well as 
“the appropriateness of the organizational structure, policies, practices, and resources of the 
Department of Defense and the Department of State for handling program management and 
contracting for the programs and contracts under review”107. In addition, the United States has 
included four specific policy changes that improve the government’s ability to obtain 
information about PMC activities and behaviour, which became public law after the 
enactment of FY2008 NDAA. PMCs are now forced to cooperate with any investigation 
conducted by the Department of Defense. In addition, as part of an ethics program, the 
government has the ability to obtain information about PMC performance by having an 
“internal audit or review programs to identify and address conduct that may violate applicable 
requirements of law and regulation”108. Furthermore, PMCs are required to provide certain 
information to the Comptroller General
109
 when requested by this person. The NDAA states 
“…each major defense contractor shall provide the Comptroller General access to information 
requested by the Comptroller General that is within the scope of the report required by this 
section [Ethics Program]”110. These new rules give the United States the right to obtain 
information at any time. Additionally, since the enactment of FY2008 NDAA, PMCs are 
required to “register, process, account for, and keep appropriate records of personnel 
performing private security functions in an area of combat operations”111. Furthermore, they 
are required to account for all the weapons that are at the PMC personnel’s disposal, as well 
as report incidents of injury and deaths. And as part of the ethics program, PMCs are required 
to meet “self-reporting requirements, under which contractors report conduct that may violate 
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applicable requirements of law or regulation to appropriate government officials”112. By 
focusing on the importance of self-reporting requirements for PMCs, the US government 
assures itself of plenty of information concerning the acts of PMCs.  
 
Conclusion 
     Comparing the domestic laws and regulations of both the United Kingdom and the United 
States, shows just how different the approaches are that each country has adopted. Whereas 
the United Kingdom has opted for a light self-regulatory scheme to control and regulate the 
private military industry, the United States has instead implemented far tighter domestic laws 
and regulation for PMCs. In the previous section I discussed how the problems related with 
the lack of regulation and control of PMCs were quite similar in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States. After the discussion on the different approaches that both countries 
have chosen to regulate and control the private military industry, I will focus on the main 
factors that have led each country to adopt a different path to regulate and control PMCs.   
 
C. The Domestic Role Perception of PMCs 
     In this section I will explain how the differences in domestic role perception of PMCs 
influenced both the United Kingdom and the United States in adopting diverging responses to 
the lack of regulation and control of PMCs. My argument is based on the notion that due to 
the preconceptions institutionalised in both the United Kingdom or the United States, 
conditioned the choices that each country had when choosing the path to regulating and 
controlling PMCs. I will argue that the different institutionalised “norms and patterns of 
behaviour” present in the United Kingdom and the United States had a strong influence on 
policymakers in both states. Under “domestic role perception of PMCs” I refer to the 
worldview that policymakers in a particular country have about the role of PMCs in their 
society and abroad. For example, some scholars have explained that the strong regulatory 
framework in South Africa is to a large extent caused by the view of most South African 
policymakers that PMC employees are troublemakers, due to their connections to the 
apartheid regime
113
 and their formation years during this period of time
114
. This conditioned 
the options to regulate PMCs, as South African policymakers increasingly saw such 
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companies in a suspicious way.  I will start by looking at how the domestic role perception of 
PMCs in the United Kingdom conditioned its policymaking. 
The United Kingdom 
     Studying the official documents in which British policymakers discuss the options for 
controlling and regulating PMCs, one can identify how British policymakers thought of 
PMCs and what they believed the role of such companies should be in the United Kingdom. 
In addition, looking at the character and nature of the SIA reveals certain views on the private 
military industry in the United Kingdom.  
     Policymakers in the United Kingdom often express the importance of the market for 
services that PMCs provide, as well as stress the impracticality of certain approaches to PMC 
regulation that would impede PMCs from doing their job effectively and according to the 
needs of the specific missions. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported that “there is a void 
in the international community’s toolbox … for adequate nation building and stabilising the 
situation … in many respects the market is demanding these [PMC] services”115, as well as 
recommend the British government to “consider carefully how to ensure that a licensing 
regime allows companies to operate with the necessary speed without compromising the 
effectiveness of the vetting process”116. In other words, the Foreign Affairs Office considers it 
crucial that PMCs are regulated and controlled, but does not ignore the fact that PMCs often 
need to act speedily and with conviction. Even so, the Foreign Affairs Office stresses that 
“despite private military companies’ concerns about client confidentiality, we conclude that 
the need to ensure that the sector is properly regulated overrides the private interests of PMCs 
and their clients”117. The 2002 Green Paper, which was at its core a call out to all involved for 
a discussion on how to regulate the private military industry, stated that one of the main 
benefits of regulating this industry was the fact that “it could help establish a respectable and 
therefore more employable industry”118. The 2002 Green Paper stated several option for 
regulation including a complete ban of PMC activity, a ban of U.K. PMC activity abroad, a 
licensing regime for military services, registration and notification, and self-regulation
119
. In 
all cases, the document states concerns about the negative or positive effects that each option 
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would have for the private military industry from a market-oriented approach. This is done 
either by stating the negative side of banning PMCs for weak states that would require their 
services, or by highlighting the advantage that a self-regulatory framework would have for 
foreigners in separating the reputable companies from the others. For example, regarding a 
total ban the 2002 Green Paper states that “such legislation [a total ban] could deprive weak 
but legitimate governments of needed support – which the international community is unable 
or unwilling to offer”, and that “a blanket ban would deprive British defence exporters of 
legitimate business – services are often a necessary part of export sales”. Furthermore, when 
discussing the disadvantages of a licensing scheme for military services the 2002 Green Paper 
states that “licensing could give rise to delay. This could work to the disadvantage both of 
British companies and their customers” and that “unless special provisions were made a 
licensing regime could put British defence exporters at a competitive disadvantage”120. These 
statements say something about the way that British policymakers view the private military 
industry. In sharp contrast to how South African policymakers viewed PMCs
121
, British 
policymakers see the benefits of having a healthy private military industry in the United 
Kingdom. Unlike the United States, as I will argue in the next section, British policymakers 
are more concerned about having a healthy private military industry than with concerns about 
coordination between PMC operations and the national soldiers. At the core of regulating the 
private military industries, and the language used in official documents discussing possible 
options for regulating the industry, one can find the United Kingdom’s interest in maintaining 
a strong and competitive private military industry that does not conflict with British foreign 
and defence objectives, and that respects human rights. PMCs are seen as actors contributing 
to the British interest as well as providing much needed services to foreign clients. In this 
light, it makes more sense that British policymakers have found the light self-regulatory 
scheme of the SIA sufficient for the purposes of the private military industry in the United 
Kingdom.  
The United States 
     In contrast to the light self-regulatory scheme for controlling and regulating PMCs, the 
United States has developed a much tighter and extensive regulatory framework. There are 
undoubtedly many factors that influenced this policy path. However, it seems likely that the 
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role perception held in the United States about PMCs in U.S. society and abroad had an 
important impact. Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States is less involved in 
maintaining a healthy private military industry. Instead, PMCs are seen by U.S. policymakers 
as an integral part of U.S. military and defence strategy. The United States is mostly 
concerned with coordinating PMC operations with operations of U.S. armed forces, and 
making sure that these companies behave according to human rights and the interest of the 
United States
122
. A clear example of this is the formation of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), a body that provided a legal framework for PMCs active in Iraq
123
. 
Interestingly, the CPA also provided PMCs legal immunity from Iraqi law. The CPA 
provided PMCs in Iraq with some minimum standards and a framework from which to keep 
expanding as needed. An additional example of the United States attempting to coordinate the 
efforts for reconstructing Iraq, was the 2004 Interagency Policy Memorandum ‘Contractor 
Security in Iraq’ prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense which “proposed guidance for all US government contractors working in Iraq and for 
government offices supporting and co-ordinating those contractors” and provided “an initial 
blueprint for eventual adoption of common contractor coordination and security rules for all 
nations providing contractors for the reconstruction of Iraq”124.  
     The Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calls for significant 
implementations and adjustments to the contents of future contracts for “contractors 
performing private security functions”125. In the NDAA it is stated that: 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation issued in accordance with section 25 of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act … shall be revised to require insertion into 
each covered contract … of a contract clause addressing the selection, training, 
equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions 
under such contracts.
126
 
     These adjustments to U.S. domestic law and regulation of PMCs is yet another 
example of how U.S. policymakers were interested in making the inclusion of PMCs 
in U.S. military and defence strategy as beneficial as possible, as well as an example 
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of the focus that these policymakers had in assuring that the behaviour of PMC 
personnel was in accord with the rules of conduct laid out by the U.S. government.  
     The emergence of PMCs as fundamental pieces in U.S. foreign military strategy is 
important in understanding how U.S. policymakers view the role of these companies. 
There were three factors that contributed to this particular view. Firstly, during the 
Clinton administration, but also under the Bush administration and the Obama 
administration, the United States downsized their military
127
. Secondly, the military 
activity of United States in foreign lands
128
 increased as a result of the attacks of 
September 11, prompting the United States’ war against terrorism129. And thirdly, 
increased domestic pressure about the United States’ presence in Afghanistan and Iraq 
made using PMC employees instead of U.S. soldiers more attractive. This is 
particularly apparent in the increasing PMC-to-U.S. soldiers ratio in the past decade, 
and in Obama’s order to pull out all U.S. soldiers from Iraq in 2011130. The figures and 
facts reported in a congressional research of Department of Defense contractors in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in May 2011 showed that “DOD [Department of Defense] relies 
extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of March 
2011, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than 
uniformed personnel (145,000)”131. This was before Obama pulled back U.S. troops 
from Iraq. 
Conclusion 
     I have attempted to show the importance of the perception that policymakers and 
officials have about the role of PMCs in the interest of their nation, and how the 
different institutionalised patterns of norms and behaviour in the United Kingdom and 
the United States influenced their choice for PMC regulation. I used South Africa as 
reference to show how the historical context of the apartheid regime in that country 
influenced South African policymakers when adopting and implementing domestic 
laws and regulation for the private military industry. I believe that the policymakers in 
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the United Kingdom and the United States have different views about the role of 
PMCs for the interest of their country. This in turn conditioned the regulatory options 
that both countries seriously considered. Firstly, the main concerns of British 
policymakers is that the country can host a healthy private military industry that 
benefits British companies as well as foreign customer that are in need of security 
services, and that these PMCs do not act in ways that are in violation of human rights, 
and in conflict with British foreign and defence policy objectives. The United 
Kingdom, unlike the United States, is not a big customer of PMCs, with an estimated 
148 million pounds spent on PMCs in recent years
132
. This amount is very small 
compared to what the United States is spending on PMCs. For example, one contract 
that the British PMC Aegis Defence Services obtained from the U.S. government 
during the Iraq War was valued at 293 million dollars, twice the amount of the total 
budget of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a supplier of military and 
security services, and the choice of British policymakers to opt for no state regulation, 
and instead have a self-regulatory body such as the SIA, is a reflection of that. On the 
other hand, the United States is far more concerned with its own operations abroad 
than with providing security and military services to foreign customers. The United 
States is concerned with coordinating the operations of its own armed forces with 
PMC operations. U.S. policymakers see PMCs as a fundamental part of their foreign 
military policy. For the United States, the purpose of PMC regulation is to assure that 
these companies behave and act according to the interest of the United States, and that 
PMC employees respect standard rules of conduct and human rights. However, in 
contrast to the United Kingdom, the United States is focused on the activities of its 
PMCs (the country hires them after all), and therefore it seems logical that U.S. 
policymakers opted for a tight regulatory framework. 
D. Military Culture 
     In this section I will explain how the differences in military cultures in the United 
Kingdom and the United States influenced both states in adopting diverging responses to the 
lack of regulation and control of PMCs. Military culture is in respect to PMCs a very relevant 
institution, for a large part of PMC personnel have a background in their nation’s military. 
Military cultures have in each country often been institutionalised as a result of past military 
                                                 
132
 War on Want (2009) Available at http://www.waronwant.org/news/press-releases/16692-licence-to-kill-for-
private-armies 
~ 33 ~ 
 
experiences, contributing to the development of a culture that conditions how individuals 
understand war and what constitutes a military victory. Culture can be described as “what a 
group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external 
environment and its problems of internal integration”133. Hillon argues that 
The values underpinning the world’s military cultures evolved throughout 
history in response to the needs of men attempting to succeed in combat, that 
is, as a result of occupational necessity. Quite simply, soldiers need codes of 
conduct, values, methods, procedures, and organizations characterized by what 
we might quaintly term the “military virtues”134. 
 
     I will argue that the pre-existing institutions of military culture in the United Kingdom and 
the United States in the decades running up to the twenty-first century, were fundamentally 
different, which in turn has had an impact on how policymakers perceived the necessity of 
different forms of PMC regulation. I will start by looking at the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom 
     British military history has been strongly influenced by the commonwealth and the 
managing of the old British Empire. As Mockaitis argues: 
The British Army has excelled in small-unit, antiguerrilla warfare as they did in 
other aspects of counterinsurgency. History had given them an army that was 
relatively small and decentralized and, therefore, ideally suited to such warfare. 
Since Britain is an island nation, the navy and not the army has been its first 
line of defense. Distrusted and underfunded, the junior service was thus 
relatively unaffected by the revolution in size and organization experienced by 
continental armies during the nineteenth century.
135
  
The United Kingdom has had a large amount of experiences in counterinsurgency missions 
during the 19th and 20
th
 century, adding to the military knowledge of the British military 
institutions as well as becoming embedded in British military culture.
136
 Looking at the recent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the United States involvement in the Korea and 
Vietnam War, it becomes apparent that enemies of great military powers are reluctant to 
combat them in a conventional way. The tendency has been for modern warfare to be 
asymmetrical, fought in small wars, and non-force-on-force battles, a type of warfare that is 
not new for the British army. This shift from conventional wars to asymmetrical ones has 
benefited the British army in the sense that they are already accustomed to the dynamics of 
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this new way of waging war. Dynamics present in the missions of counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan and especially Iraq.  
     The British approach to warfare was first documented in the Peninsular War against 
Napoleon, acknowledging inferiority in numbers. The Duke of Wellington, Arthur Wellesley 
was well aware of Napoleon’s superiority on terrain137, and as such chose to distract the 
French Army by pulling them out of the south. This opened a window of opportunity for 
Spanish guerrillas to attack “French outposts and lines of communication”138. As Cassidy 
argues “the British way of war was in fact highly specialized, which contrasted sharply with 
war as fought between great industrial powers”139. The British approach was focused on small 
wars, as well as on the skills of the soldier, rather than the system. War for the British was 
about small victories and low casualties, not about long sizeable battles and significant troop 
losses
140
. This had its disadvantages, as became apparent in the Boer Wars and the two world 
wars. It also had the effect of creating an exotic view of war in British minds, seeing war as an 
exciting adventure in foreign lands
141
. 
     After the Second World War, British soldiers
142
 were already accustomed to and 
experienced with techniques of military insurgency and guerrilla warfare. The British army 
adapted their knowledge of rebel tactics it had learned from its imperial past
143
. When 
discussing the advantages that this brought the British army, Pimlott notes the fact that “the 
British advantage in a tradition of flexibility, based upon the fact that throughout the colonial 
policing campaigns of the past they had been forced to make do with only limited 
resources”144. Perhaps the most important factor of British success in counterinsurgency was 
its integrated civil-military approach, in which command was held by civilian officials that 
kept the overall political strategy in mind, while the army accepted this civilian control and 
recognised the need to employ minimum force
145
. The British Army was flexible and 
extremely capable of adapting to local circumstances and requirements, while identifying 
when large scale wars were not being successful and switching to small scale tactics
146
. 
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Cassidy illustrates how the British army was capable of achieving political outcomes that 
benefited the United Kingdom: 
The British Army fought its post-World War II campaigns in the 
predominantly rural jungle conditions of Malaya, Kenya, Borneo, Guyana, and 
Dhofar to the desert conditions of Palestine; Muscat and Oman; Radfan; and 
Kuwait and was successful in small-scale and medium-scale operations. The 
British Army helped bring about favourable political outcomes for Britain. In 
almost every case of devolution, newly independent states allowed the British 
Army to retain facilities in their countries”.147 
These past experiences and successes that the British army had in its imperial as well as post-
World War II period, became embedded and institutionalised in British military culture. The 
British army saw counterinsurgency and small wars as “the norm”148. The historical, as well 
as the geographical context of British military operations have helped shape a “pragmatic, 
indirect British approach to strategy
149”. These factors make the British military culture an 
advantageous one for soldiers that need to operate in counterinsurgent operations such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The important fact that many British PMCs hire ex-British military 
soldiers, means that this British military culture goes with them, and helps them be successful 
in the type of operations that PMCs are often hired to do. The choices of British 
policymakers, when it comes to military questions, are strongly conditioned by the historical 
heritage of the British military’s past and the culture it has formed throughout the years. This 
is no different in the case of regulating and controlling the private military industry of the 
United Kingdom. Since British soldiers are seen to have this military culture embedded in 
them, they are also perceived to have the right skills and experience to act successfully and 
appropriately in the type of operations that PMCs often undertake. The British military culture 
conditions the options that British policymakers consider when regulating PMCs, by 
minimising the perceived necessity of regulating soldiers (or now PMC employees) that have 
the values and norms of the British military culture embedded in them. The light self-
regulatory framework that is present in the United Kingdom is in my view a reflection of this. 
The United States 
     In contrast to the United Kingdom, the United States has historically little knowledge or 
experience with counterinsurgency and small wars. Indeed, Hillen argues that “the post–Cold 
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War shift in U.S. policy toward preparing for peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, 
Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda will challenge a traditional military culture rooted in the heroic 
efforts of past wars”150. Similarly, it could be argued that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
representing the shift towards counterinsurgency operations, will also challenge the traditional 
U.S. military culture
151
. 
     One of the fundamental factors in determining the military culture of a nation is the 
organisation of its army and the manner in which it conducts its missions
152
. The United 
States has for a long time based its military strategy on logistics, “overwhelming superiority”, 
and a strong emphasis on technological superiority. The latter has been a particularly 
important cornerstone of U.S. military strategy in the last decades, since the downsizing of the 
U.S. military has prompted U.S. policymakers to believe that the United States needed to 
compensate for its shrinking numbers with technological advancements
153
. It is no surprise 
then that the U.S. military culture does not particularly suit the dynamics of 
counterinsurgency and small wars that are characteristic of the Afghanistan and Iraq War. In 
these types of conflicts, U.S. soldiers often lack the skills and experience that their British 
counterparts have in communicating with the locals, and achieving outcomes that are 
beneficial to their country. Furthermore, Cassidy argues that the U.S. army has always had a 
preference for fighting large scale wars, while maintaining certain reluctance to adapt to the 
new challenges of counterinsurgency and “low-level warfare”. The United States remained 
stubbornly loyal to their traditional approach based on technological and numerical 
superiority
154
. The First and Second World Wars only reinforced this believe in traditional 
U.S. military culture. 
     Due to this traditional approach to warfare, and in contrast to the British counterpart, the 
U.S. army has had little experience and gathered little applied knowledge on how to handle 
situations in which soldiers need to operate in uncertainty and numerical disadvantage. This 
has had consequences for how U.S. soldiers are perceived by the locals of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Whereas the British soldiers and British PMC employees know how to handle delicate 
situations, and understand and know how to win the minds and hearts of the locals, the U.S. 
soldiers and U.S. PMC employees isolate themselves from locals and keep their distance. In 
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addition, U.S. military culture influences the tendency of American soldiers to be distrustful 
of locals, which have the negative consequences of missing out on crucial information, as 
well as causing accidents that could have otherwise been prevented
155
. It can be argued that 
the U.S. military culture was not yet prepared for the Afghanistan and Iraq War. Many cases 
were documented of unprovoked killings of locals in Iraq
156
, bringing to light the problems 
that the U.S. military culture brings for counterinsurgency operations of U.S. soldiers and 
U.S. PMCs. The same way that British policymakers are conditioned by the military culture 
of their state, U.S. policymakers are influenced by the military culture of theirs. U.S. soldiers 
in general lack the skills and knowledge to handle sensitive situations of counterinsurgency 
missions, as well as to win the hearts and minds of the locals. This lack of experience during 
the Afghanistan and Iraq war prompted U.S. policymakers to implement a tighter regulatory 
framework in order to control the behaviour of their soldiers and the PMCs that they hire. The 
norms and values embedded and institutionalised in the U.S. military culture has had a 
relevant impact on how the perception was created under U.S. policymakers that regulation 
was indeed needed. 
 
Conclusion 
     British military history has been strongly influenced by the commonwealth and the 
managing of the old British Empire, where low-level battles, counterinsurgency operations 
and small wars were common. This historical heritage has equipped British soldiers with the 
right skills and experience to act successfully and appropriately in the type of operations that 
PMCs often undertake. In contrast to the United Kingdom, the United States has historically 
lacked this knowledge or experience with counterinsurgency and small wars. U.S. military 
culture is often said to condition American soldiers to be distrustful of locals, which have the 
negative consequences of missing out on crucial information, as well as causing accidents that 
could have otherwise been prevented. The military cultures of these states are important 
because a large part of PMC employees have a background in their national army, taking with 
them the norms, values, and behaviours that are embedded and institutionalised in their 
national military culture. The policymakers of both states were conditioned by the military 
culture of their state. The British approach is characterised by the limited perceived necessity 
of regulating soldiers. The light self-regulatory framework that is present in the United 
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Kingdom is a result of these considerations. In sharp contrast, U.S. soldiers in general lack the 
skills and knowledge to handle sensitive situations of counterinsurgency missions, as well as 
to win the hearts and minds of the locals. U.S. military culture condition policymakers to 
consider tighter regulatory measures in order to keep under control the behaviour of U.S. 
PMC personnel. 
E. Orientation shifts in Policymaking 
     In this section I will explain how orientation in policymaking influenced both the United 
Kingdom and the United States in adopting diverging responses to the lack of regulation and 
control of PMCs. I will argue that choices of both the United Kingdom and the United States 
for regulating PMCs were conditioned by the way of thinking and the orientation of domestic 
policymaking in general. I will argue that the different institutionalised norms and patterns of 
behaviour present in the United Kingdom and the United States had a strong influence on 
policymakers in both states.  
     As was mentioned in the literature review, the United Kingdom has been in a process of 
privatisation since the 1980s, under the Thatcher administration and later the Blair 
administration, in which many areas that traditionally were considered part of government’s 
tasks were now being outsourced to private companies
157
. Part of the reasoning for the 
privatisation of government tasks, is that Britain no longer was an imperial power, and 
therefore needed to reduce its activities abroad and strive to make the British government 
smaller, but also it was often seen as a reaction to the 1973 Oil Crisis. Neo-liberal thought, 
and a strong believe in market-approaches was embedded in policymaking rationale in the 
United Kingdom for much of the last three decades
158
. Experts and policymakers in the 
United Kingdom often display a strong believe in market forces and see government 
intervention as hindering the proper functioning of an industry. As Krahmann argues:  
The British government has thus from the start adopted a market-oriented 
approach to the emerging private military service industry. The outsourcing of 
military functions to private firms has been designed to draw on the existing 
expertise of private businesses in producing services at maximum value for 
money. Governmental involvement in the privatized sector has been perceived 
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as hindering this aim because it would restrict the ability of companies to 
operate according to market principles. 
Krahmann, in her discussion comparing Germany and the United Kingdom in how they 
regulated and controlled private actors providing security services, illustrates how Germany 
held a far tighter control on the private security industry due to strong strategic concerns in 
the form of corporate shareholding and joint ventures
159
. The United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, gave more importance to the argument that market forces would better regulate the 
industry, and less to the strategic concerns that the German policymakers had. Self-regulation 
is often the preferred choice of British policymakers. This could be seen as a sign of the 
predominance of the neo-liberalist thought in the United Kingdom, and the strong impact it 
had on the speed of privatisation of the defence industry, as well as the strong focus on self-
regulation. The United Kingdom has privatised British Aerospace, British Telecom, water and 
electricity, as well as the National Health System and the Royal Mail
160
. In each area of 
privatisation, productiveness and efficiency are often arguments that are used to support them. 
British policymakers are particularly comfortable, much more so than most European 
governments, to privatise important governmental sectors, as well as letting the industry 
regulate itself. Even the Labour Party, traditionally a party considered to be positioned on the 
left of the political spectrum, found it relatively easy to adopt aspects of the neo-liberal 
ideology, as the Blair administration kept privatising more areas of government. Neo-
liberalism seems to have been embedded in British politics since the oil crisis of 1973, 
influencing how British policymakers approach domestic issues. It seems unsurprising then 
that British policymakers strongly considered options to regulate the private military industry 
that were aligned with what was common and institutionalised in British policymaking 
behaviour. Self-regulation and strong faith in market forces to deliver positive outcomes is at 
the core of the choices that are made in the United Kingdom. Institutionalised neo-liberal 
norms and values held by most British policymakers conditioned the choices that were 
seriously considered, and the result has been the choice to do nothing as a government, and 
instead to actively support the self-regulation of the private military industry.  
     Whereas the Thatcher administration reintroduced the neo-liberal ideology into British 
politics after years of the social democratic orientation of government, such reintroduction 
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was not needed in the United States, since the country has long had a strong liberal
161
 
economic ideology, showing preference for small government over intrusive government. The 
Second World War has proved to be an important factor in explaining why European nation 
states adopted social welfare programs to help their citizens rebuild after the chaos of two 
world wars. The United States did not suffer to the same degree as European states did from 
both world wars, and therefore never became a social welfare state as the United Kingdom
162
 
and other European states did. British policymakers during the Thatcher years changed and 
restructured many of the social programs that had been implemented throughout the years 
since the Second World War
163
. The United States did not undergo a transitional period in 
which the country shifted from a liberal laissez-faire system to a social democratic regime 
after the Second World War, to then reintroduce core liberal principals in a new way in the 
years after the 1973 Oil Crisis. The Reagan administration was also characterised by neo-
liberal principals, but it did not represent a change in orientation in civil servants and 
policymakers. When needed, policymakers in the United States have shown to be willing to 
consider options that are not entirely aligned to either neo-liberal principals, or options letting 
market forces regulate industries. A good example of this has been the 2010 healthcare reform 
that took place in the United States, whereas the National Health System in the United 
Kingdom has seen elements of privatisation, especially in management of hospitals under the 
Health Act
164
. Due to their historical context, certain norms and patterns of behaviour have 
been institutionalised in both states. In the case of the United States, the fact that liberalism 
has always been the main approach to government, the state only acts in areas where it 
believes government intrusion is required. In addition, the fact that the United States has had 
to take on the role of a superpower, it has had to increase the reach of its government to 
manage this new role. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, comes from being a 
superpower, and has had to adjust to its new role by reducing the tasks that the British 
government is responsible for. The orientations of policymakers in both countries have 
arguably conditioned the options that policymakers seriously consider when adjusting 
domestic law or regulation. In this case, the orientation of policymaking in the United States 
is one that is not afraid or phobic about increasing the reach of government in certain areas. 
On the other hand, the transition that the United Kingdom underwent in the 1970s and 1980s 
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created an orientation towards self-regulation and laissez-faire approaches, which made 
British policymakers more prone to opt for an approach more aligned with neo-liberal 
principals, as well as place more faith in market forces to regulate industries. In the case of the 
private military industry, the United States and the United Kingdom differed in approach, 
which from my point of view can be partially explained by the institutionalised orientation of 
policymakers in each country.  
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6. Conclusion 
     The aim of this thesis has been to explain why the United Kingdom and the United States 
arrived to different legislative and regulatory outcomes concerning the regulation of the 
private military industry. The research question was: What factors account for the different 
legislative and regulatory responses of the United Kingdom and the United States to the 
issues related to private military companies? This thesis provides three main findings.  
     Firstly, it shows the importance of the perception that policymakers and officials have 
about the role of PMCs in their state. I argued that the main concerns of British policymakers 
were that the country can host a healthy private military industry that benefits British 
companies as well as foreign customer that are in need of security services, and that these 
PMCs do not act in ways that are in violation of human rights, and in conflict with British 
foreign and defence policy objectives. In contrast, U.S. policymakers see PMCs as a 
fundamental part of their foreign military policy. The purpose of PMC regulation is to assure 
that these companies behave and act according to the interest of the United States, and that 
PMC employees respect standard rules of conduct and human rights. These different 
institutionalised patterns of norms and behaviour in the United Kingdom and the United 
States influenced their choice for PMC regulation. 
     Secondly, it shows the importance of military culture. I argued that the historical military 
heritage of the Commonwealth and the British Empire has equipped British soldiers with the 
right skills and experience to act successfully and appropriately in the type of operations that 
PMCs often undertake, leading policymakers to not see the necessity of regulating British 
PMCs other than with a self-regulatory licensing scheme. On the other hand, U.S. soldiers in 
general lack the skills and knowledge to handle sensitive situations of counterinsurgency 
missions, as well as the skill to win the hearts and minds of the locals. U.S. military culture 
condition policymakers to consider tighter regulatory measures in order to keep under control 
the behaviour of U.S. PMC personnel. 
     And lastly, it shows the importance of the orientation of policymakers. I argued that the 
United Kingdom underwent a transition from social democracy to neo-liberalism in the 1970s 
which created an orientation towards self-regulation and laissez-faire approaches, which made 
British policymakers more prone to opt for an approach more aligned with neo-liberal 
principals, as well as place more faith in market forces to regulate industries. The orientation 
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of policymaking in the United States on the other hand, is one that is not afraid or phobic 
about increasing the reach of government in certain areas. The different orientations of 
policymakers affected the choices to which both states arrived. 
     Before presenting the analysis, I started by reviewing the academic literature that attempts 
to explain what the factors are that influence the choices that policymakers make when 
regulating the private military industry and other quasi-military private actors. I then 
explained the use of historical institutionalism to answer my research question, followed by 
the methodology used to come to my main findings, which consisted mostly of a 
historiographical approach in combination with text and document based techniques.  
     Further studies should focus on three things. Firstly, they should attempt to test the three 
independent variables used in this thesis on other cases, despite the limited amount of states 
that would meet the requirements. Secondly, they should seek to find new variables that help 
us understand why different states reach different outcomes. A more comprehensive 
explanation is required to fully explain the dependent variable. And lastly, they should focus 
on broadening the theoretical scope to explain in different ways what makes states regulate 
PMCs, as well as explain why they do so in a certain configuration. 
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